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1 Introduction1
As shown by Aiyagari, Marcet, Sargent and Seppälä (2002) the structure of
debt is a critical ingredient for determining the properties of optimal taxes.
Optimal taxes under incomplete markets (where governments cannot achieve
full insurance) display a near-unit root component that is absent under com-
plete markets. However, it is far from obvious how to determine whether
complete or incomplete markets o¤er the best paradigm for issues in public
nance. Advocates of incomplete markets appeal to alleged moral hazard dif-
culties as well as the problems of limited commitment and transaction costs
that government face. All of these features combine to reduce the range of
contingent securities at the governments disposal. However, it is well known
that when markets are incomplete some properties of the aggregate real al-
locations and asset prices are close to the rst best.2 Further, it has been
shown that various policy instruments e¤ectively complete the markets even
when assets insuring for all contingencies do not exist.3 These results suggest
that it is not possible to discriminate between the relevance of complete or
incomplete market models by looking at the range of securities governments
can issue.
The aim of this paper is to consider the properties of debt under a variety
of optimal tax models and use these results to propose tests for the empirical
importance of complete versus incomplete markets. In particular we suggest
1albert.marcet@iae.csic.es, Institut dAnàlisi Econòmica CSIC, Universitat Autònoma
de Barcelona, 08193, Bellaterra, Spain. ascott@london.edu, Department of Economics,
London Business School, Regents Park, London NW1 4SA, UK. We thank Elisa Faraglia,
Arantza Gorostiaga, Christel Rendu, Arpad Abraham and Alexis Anagnostopoulos for
research assistance. This work was sponsored by H.M.Treasury and the ESRCs Evolving
Macroeconomy program. Marcets research was funded in part by CREI, DGES, CREA
program of Barcelona Economicsand CIRIT. For comments we thank Fernando Álvarez,
Elisa Faraglia, Paul Klein, Juan P. Nicolini, Victor Ríos-Rull and an anonymous referee as
well as seminar participants at CEPR European Summer Symposium in Macroeconomics,
Tarragona, CEPR Public Finance Conference, Tilburg, H.M.Treasury, IIES, Stockholm,
London School of Economics, Universite de Toulouse, and Universidad T. di Tella.
2See, for example, Telmer (1993), Heaton and Lucas (1996), Krusell and Smith (1998)
and Marcet and Singleton (1999).
3See, inter alia, Bohn (1990), Calvo and Guidotti (1990), Campbell and Shiller (1996),
de Fontenay, Milessi-Feretti and Pill (1995), Missale (1999), Lloyd-Ellis and Zhu (2000).
Closer to our work are Angeletos (2002), Buera and Nicolini (2004) and Chari, Christiano
and Kehoe (1994) on e¤ectively completing markets in an optimal policy framework, we
discuss these in section 6.
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two specic tests for market incompleteness based on comparing the proper-
ties of debt and decit in the data with the behavior of these variables in the
model. The rst concerns the relative persistence of debt and decits. That
debt is highly persistent under incomplete markets has been commented on
before (the analysis of Barro (1978), Aiyagari et al. (2002) suggests that
debt contains a unit root). The idea of this paper is to test for market in-
completeness by studying the relative persistence of debt compared to the
primary decit: under incomplete markets debt is much more persistent than
decits. By contrast, we show that decit and debt tend to have a similar
persistence under complete markets.
Our second test for incomplete markets has to do with the co-movement
of debt and decits and it builds on an insight that has, to our knowledge,
not been discussed before. We argue that under complete markets, govern-
ment debt should fall in response to shocks that cause the primary decit to
increase. This is because under complete markets the optimal debt portfolio
held by the government to achieve smooth taxes involves an apparent "over-
insurance", in the sense that the optimal portfolio pays much more than the
income loss experienced in the period where a bad shock occurs. By contrast,
the optimal policy under incomplete markets entails using debt as a bu¤er
stock so that a bad shock brings about both a higher decit and a higher
debt.
Evaluating US post WW II data using these two criteria suggests strongly
the importance of incomplete markets: the relative persistence of debt is very
high and deft and decits co-move in the same direction. We also show that
other aspects of a simple incomplete markets model t important aspects of
the data.
Justifying and implementing these two tests is the core of our paper.
Aside from the importance of the hypothesis being investigated the strength
of these tests is their sharpness. Applying classical unit root tests to either
debt or taxes is subject to well known size and power problems, as well as the
sensitivity of asymptotic distributions to small changes in the null hypothesis.
Furthermore, strictly speaking, a model of complete markets with capital
accumulation does have a near-unit root, so existence or not of a unit root is
not a good way to discriminate between complete and incomplete markets.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 examines US post-1950
data and documents a number of facts on the stochastic properties of debt
and decits. Section 3 begins our theoretical analysis of the behaviour of
debt when governments pursue an optimal taxation approach. It uses the
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canonical Lucas and Stokey (1983) model and considers the dynamic behav-
iour of debt under both complete and incomplete markets when the economy
is subject to both productivity and expenditure shocks. Section 4 provides a
broader characterization of debt dynamics across a class of standard macro
models, and we focus on the case where capital accumulation is introduced.
In Section 5 we turn to simulations to both conrm the relevance of our two
tests but also to quantify the importance of these e¤ects vis a vis the stylized
facts discussed in Section 2. Section 6 considers a number of implications
and extensions of our work while a nal section concludes.
2 The Behaviour of US Government Debt
The purpose of this section is to establish some stylized facts about debt
in preparation for evaluating our competing theoretical models. The main
theoretical variable of interest in our analysis will be the market value of
outstanding government debt. However, the nearest published equivalent
is the face value of outstanding government debt. As detailed in the Data
Appendix we use the work and methods of Seater (1981), Cox and Hirschorn
(1983) and Butkiewicz (1983) to construct an annual series for the market
value covering the period 1900-99. However, in what follows we focus on
the post-1950 period, although none of our results are seriously a¤ected by
using the longer sample. Our focus on the post-1950 data is to exclude the
e¤ects of war -inclusion of war time data should requires tting an exogenous
process for government expenditure that adequately capture large outliers.
Failure to adequately deal with these outliers is well known to lead to positive
biases in estimating persistence and so we avoid this potential complication
by focusing on post-1950 data.
To summarize the properties of the data we rst consider a minimal VAR
which includes the primary decit, GDP and the market value of government
debt. In order to work with data that is stationary, we use the primary
decit/GDP ratio, the change in the logarithm of GDP and the debt/GDP
ratio. We do not think of this VAR as a direct way of testing a particular
structural model nor as providing a denitive characterization of how scal
policy impacts on the economy4 and because it is non-structural we do not
wish to imbue the results as having any causal interpretation. Rather, we
4See Blanchard and Perotti (1999) or Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004) for such
an analysis.
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use the VAR as a convenient way to summarize the data and how debt
evolves in response to decit and GDP shocks. Our identication scheme
for the VAR is to perform a Cholesky decomposition and we order the VAR
by placing the decit rst, output growth next and nally our market value
of government debt variable. By placing debt last we are able to detail how
debt responds to variations in the prior listed variables. We sometimes follow
the common practice of calling the rst orthogonalized shock the decit
shock, the second the output shockand so on. However, we note that this
nomenclature may mislead - for instance, in the models we consider the rst
shock in our estimated VAR (that is, the "decit shock") contains a large
part of the innovation to productivity, since this will inuence tax revenues
and, therefore, the decit5.
Figure 1 shows the estimated impulse response functions from our basic
trivariate VAR specication6. The stochastic properties of debt and decit
can be summarized as follows:
Fact 1 Relative Persistence. Both the innovations to the decit and GDP
equations are followed by large and very persistent swings in the market
value of debt. The swings in debt are far more persistent than those in
any other variable of interest.
Fact 2 Co-movement of Decit and Debt Positive innovations to the
primary decit are followed by an increase in the market value of debt.
5The observant reader will note that in the introduction we discussed how government
expenditure shocks a¤ect debt while in our VAR we use the primary decit. We do not
use government spending data in the VAR for two reasons. The rst is that our analysis
covers a variety of shocks i.e productivity as well as expenditure shocks, and our focus
is how the optimal response of primary decits to these shocks feeds into debt. The
second is an econometric issue. Over our sample period there is evidence that government
expenditure relative to GDP is non-stationary whereas the primary decit relative to
GDP is stationary. The consequence of using the primary decit rather than expenditure
is that our decit shocks are not primitives of our true theoretical model. However,
we overcome these problems by i) estimating exactly the same VARs using our simulated
data as we do with actual US data i.e using decits rather than expenditure in the model
also, and ii) also for our theoretical models calculating the true impulse response functions
of endogenous variables to the raw shocks i.e expenditure shocks, so that the reader can
easily map the relationship between an (exogenous) innovation to government spending
and an (endogenous) innovation to decit.
6Results are robust to a wide range of di¤erent VAR specications and estimators.
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Fact 3 A higher decit today signals a higher decit over the next ve or six
years, that is, decits show persistent uctuations.
Fact 4 Positive innovations to GDP are followed by reductions in future decits
and debt.7
As we shall see later, Facts 1 and 2 form the core of our test for discrim-
inating between complete and incomplete markets. Fact 3 will also be im-
portant in order to provide a relevant calibration of the exogenous processes.
Facts 4 will also be brought out by the incomplete markets model.
Studying impulse response functions provides a highly detailed picture of
interactions between endogenous variables but is sensitive to the ordering of
variables and the dimension of the system. Therefore as an additional more
robust measure of persistence we utilize the k-variance ratio dened as8
P ky =
V ar(yt   yt k)
k V ar(yt   yt 1)
In the case of a stationary and ergodic variable we have V ar(yt   yt k) !
2 var(yt) and, therefore, P ky ! 0 as k ! 1. For instance, in the case of an
i.i.d. process P ky = 1=k. By contrast in the case of a pure unit root P
k
y = 1
for all k. Roughly speaking, the more persistent is variable y, the longer it
takes for P ky to go to zero as k grows.
Estimates of P ky for a selection of key variables are shown in Figure 2.
Since the k-variance ratios for debt are far higher than those for other vari-
ables, our earlier nding that debt shows greater persistence than other vari-
ables is repeated. The persistence of debt is marked even after 10 years and is
7Notice that innovations to the debt ratio are signicantly di¤erent from zero for the
rst few lags of the Debt/GDP equation and persistent. It is not clear why this occurs,
in our model the government budget constraint states an identity between debt, decits
and interest rates. We have tested if this shock captures interest rate e¤ects, but when
we include interest rates in the VAR the size and e¤ect of these debt shocks remains
essentially unchanged. Various possible explanations for the existence of these shocks
are: i) measurement error - over a long sample there are many changes of denition
of debt, revaluation e¤ects and asset sales which will the cause the identity not to hold
exactly, ii) approximation error - a linear VAR may not fully capture the non-linear nature
of the governments budget constraint and of the Debt/output ratio, iii) identication
problems; it may be that the current identication leaves some of the innovations in the
other variables to appear as debt shocks.
8Cochrane (1988) uses this statistic in the macroeconomics literature to measure per-
sistence in US GDP data.
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still rising. Because P ky = 1+
k 1P
j=1
k j
k
j where j is the correlation of yt with
yt j the rising prole of P kDebt in Figure 2 is consistent with a unit root for
debt and with positively serially correlated decits, providing further insight
into the co-movement between decits and debt.
Having documented empirically the dynamic behaviour of debt we now
turn out attention to characterize theoretically its behaviour under complete
and incomplete markets.
3 A model without capital
In this section we o¤er a characterization of debt dynamics in a canonical
model of optimal taxation. The complete markets version of the model is
very close to Lucas and Stokey (1983), the incomplete markets version is
very close to Aiyagari et al. (2002). We show how the relative persistence of
debt and the co-movement between decit and debt is very di¤erent under
complete and incomplete markets and that the latter ts the data much
better. Many of the results will be derived analytically, and where analytic
results cannot be found we provide a simple intuition.
We augment the model of Lucas and Stokey (1983) to include a produc-
tivity shock t so that output is given by yt = t(1   lt) where lt denotes
leisure.9 The resource constraint is yt = ct + gt where c denotes private con-
sumption and g government expenditure. Using the notation st  (gt; t); the
stochastic process fstg is assumed exogenous and Markov. The representa-
tive consumer has utility function E0
P1
t=0 
t u(ct; lt): A representative rm
maximizes prots. Consumers and rms are competitive, they take prices
and taxes as given, hence wage is equal to t. The consumer pays a propor-
tional tax rate  t on labor income. Consumer, rms and government observe
all shocks up to the current period.
We look for a Ramsey equilibrium, where government chooses taxes and
debt in order to maximize the consumers utility, government satises its
budget constraint, and it knows the mapping between taxes and competitive
equilibrium allocations. The government has full commitment to implement
the best sequence of (possibly time inconsistent) taxes and government debt.
9Angeletos (2002), Buera and Nicolini (2004), Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1994),
Farhi (2005), Gorostiaga (2003), Scott (2007) Zhu (1992) and a few others also study
optimal scal policy in models with productivity shocks.
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3.1 Complete markets
Under complete markets (the case studied by Lucas and Stokey) the govern-
ment faces the budget constraint
bgt 1(st) = gt    tt(1  lt) +
Z
bgt (s) p
b
t(s) ds (1)
where s is a possible realization of st and b
g
t (s) denotes the amount of one-
period real bonds held by the government paying one unit of consumption
in the next period in the event that st+1 = s. For all other realizations the
bond will pay nothing. The price of this bond is pbt(s). As usual, uc;t denotes
the marginal utility of consumption in period t.
It is well known that all equilibrium conditions can be summarized by
one implementability condition holding at time t = 0.10 Using the notation
for the primary decit !gt  gt    tt(1   lt), results in Lucas and Stokey
insure that the optimal allocation satises
( t;ct; lt; yt; !
g
t ) = G(st) (2)
for all t > 0; and a time-invariant function G: That is, all variables at time
t depend only on the shocks of the current period.
The value of the bond portfolio held by the government in period t is
vbgt 
Z
bgt (s) p
b
t(s) ds
Correspondingly,  vbgt is the value of government debt.
From (1) it can be seen that there is a potential ambiguity about whether
it is  vbgt or  bgt 1(st) that should be taken as the quantity in the model
representing the value of debt. In appendix 4 we discuss this issue at length,
we argue that vbg is the relevant quantity and that both quantities are very
similar in the empirically relevant case of shocks that give rise to serially
correlated decits.
3.1.1 Persistence
The budget constraint (1) shows the payo¤ of past periods bond portfolio
bgt 1(st) in the left side of the equation, suggesting that the current value
10More precisely, a feasible allocation for c; l in this model is a competitive equilibrium
if and only if the implementability condition E0
P1
t=0 
t uc;t
uc;0
(gt  tt(1  lt)) = bg 1 holds.
9
of debt depends on past outstanding debt. Therefore, a quick look at this
equation would suggest that todays value of debt depends on past shocks
and that debt is likely to be more persistence than other variables in the
economy. For example, it would seem that if st is iid the value of debt is
likely to be serially correlated. What follows is an argument that under
complete markets this intuition is misleading.
It can be shown that,
vbgt = Et
1X
j=1
j
uc;t+j
uc;t
!gt+j (3)
for all t and all realizations, and that this equation combined with (2) gives11
vbgt = V
g(st) (4)
for all t > 0; and a time-invariant function Vg: This says that there is no
direct impact of past shocks and past debt on todays level of debt. This
shows that debt is likely to have the same persistence as output and decit,
more precisely, if gt and t each have the same serial correlation then, up to
a linear approximation to the functions Vg and G, output, debt and decit
all have the same serial correlation as st: This provides a strict proof that,
up to linear approximations, complete markets is at odds with Fact 1.12
The intuition for this result is the following. Tax smoothing means that,
to a large extent, the government wants to keep similar level of taxes over
time. So, the optimal portfolio insulates governments discounted wealth
from shocks, government wealth is constant (on average) over time and in
this way a given average level of taxes can be maintained forever.
3.1.2 Co-movement of decit and debt
It is well known that under complete markets and a Ramsey planner labor
taxes are essentially constant13. Consider the case where gt is positively
serially correlated and consider a realization where gt is unexpectedly high.
Constant taxes and high g mean that the decit !gt is likely to increase, and
11These two results are established formally in part B) oproposition 1 in section 4.
12Simulations in Section 6 will conrm that even taking into account the non-linearity
of Vg and G the complete market model does not agree with Fact 1.
13This is discussed in detail, for example, in Zhu (1992) and Scott (2007). Also, see
Chari and Kehoe (1999) for a review.
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in the case that g is persistent this means all future decits are likely to be
higher. Therefore, vbgt is likely to increase, since according to (3) it is roughly
an expectation of future decits. Therefore, debt (equal to  vbgt ) is likely to
fall in response to persistent and adverse expenditure shocks while decits go
up. Hence, in general we would expect the co-movement of debt and decit
to be negative under complete markets. The reason for this odd behavior of
debt is that in a reasonable calibration of the model the optimal choice for
debt government will apparently "over-insure" bad shocks.
To be precise let us specialize the setting. Let Gc; G! denote the coordi-
nates of the G function in (2) corresponding to consumption and decit, let
Gc0; G!0 be the partial derivatives with respect to g, assume
Ai)  is constant and gt = a+ gt 1 + "
g
t for "
g
t iid mean zero, and  > 0:
Aii) Gc; G! are di¤erentiable, and their derivatives satisfy G0c < 0 and
G0! > 0. Also assume u is separable in consumption and leisure.
The rst assumption is for simplicity and because  > 0 is required for
the model is consistent with Fact 3. The second assumption requires that
optimal policy involves increasing the decit and lowering consumption when
government spending is higher; it is an assumption on the equilibrium laws
of motion that holds in most applications found in the literature in the case
of complete markets.14
Appendix 2 shows the formula for @ vb
g
t
@ "gt
. Ignoring interest rate e¤ects
(that is, assuming uc;t = 1) the formula shows unambiguously that
@ vbgt
@ "gt
>
0: Therefore, in this case the value of debt goes down when "gt goes up.
Since decit increases at the same time, this shows that in this case the
co-movement of debt and decit is negative. Furthermore, in Appendix 2
we argue that for general u that for @ vb
g
t
@ "gt
to be negative three elements
are needed: a high elasticity of interest rates to g, a positive amount of
government savings, and low serial correlation of g. Since the data does not
seem to show any of these properties, we would claim a reasonable calibration
of the model will give that current debt should go down in response to a high
"gt .
14One can nd utility functions that violate Aii). For example, if consumption is an
inferior good consumption may go up with higher g. To our knowledge nobody has argued
that this may be an important element in the analysis of scal policy.
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The intuition for this odd behavior of debt is that in an economy where
persistent shocks cause the decit to go up the optimal insurance policy
appears to provide "over-insurance". The optimal portfolio is such that when
an adverse shock occurs, the bond portfolio pays out more than todays high
decit, in anticipation of the following high decits that are likely to come.
Under complete markets contingent debt provides insurance equal to the net
present value of the shock, in the case of persistent shocks this is more than
the current value and so the market value of debt actually declines.
3.2 Incomplete Markets
We now assume a particular form of market incompleteness. Agents can only
issue one-period debt which pays a risk free rate of return. In this case the
government budget constraint is15
bgt 1 = gt    tt(1  lt) + bgt pbt (5)
where bgt denotes the number of bonds the government holds at time t; each
bond pays one unit of consumption good next period with certainty. The
price of each bond is pbt . Analogously to the complete markets, the value of
government debt is  vbgt   pbtbgt :
In this case the payo¤ of the bond is the same across realizations and it
is impossible to construct a portfolio that allows the government to smooth
taxes in the same way as in the complete markets model. This introduces
additional constraints in the allocations that are available to the government,
in particular, now it is not possible to summarize all equilibrium constraints
in one period zero budget constraint, and the budget constraints in each
period matter. The optimal allocation satises
( t;ct; lt; yt; t) = GIM(st; t 1; b
g
t 1) (6)
where t is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the implementability
constraint in period t. Relative to complete markets, the policy function
includes two new state variables t 1; b
g
t 1. The multiplier t contains a
near-martingale component.16
15This assumption has been used in models of optimal policy by Aiyagari et al. (2002),
Scott (2007), Farhi (2006).
16See Aiyagari et al. for a detailed discussion of these facts.
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3.2.1 Persistence
It is the presence of these new state variables that breaks the argument in
section 3.1.1, in which we proved that debt, decit and output have the same
persistence under complete markets. That result followed directly from (4),
and this equation was obtained by combining (3) with (2). Under incomplete
markets, it turns out that an equation such as (3) is still valid,17 but the
presence of the new state variables (t 1; b
g
t 1) means that now we can only
infer from (3) that vbgt = V
g(st;t 1; b
g
t 1): This simply conrms that, under
incomplete markets, current debt depends on past debt just as it would be
inferred from a quick look at the budget constraint. Furthermore, the new
and highly persistent martingale process ftg could inuence di¤erently the
dynamics of debt compared to other variables leading to the possibility that
debt shows greater persistence.
This shows the argument of equal persistence for debt and other variables
breaks down but it does not yet prove that debt has a larger relative persis-
tence under incomplete markets. To understand why this may be the case
consider the following general intuition.
Under complete markets, a high gt implied a high !
g
t : The government
could sustain this policy by constructing a portfolio that insured these shocks.
For example, in the case that g is iid the value of debt vbgt is roughly constant,
and it is the payo¤ of last periods debt bgt 1(gt) that makes the adjustment.
By contrast, under incomplete markets the payo¤ bgt 1 is predetermined and
it cannot adjust. Therefore, for the government to sustain a higher !gt the
value of debt vbgt has to increase. Once increased it stays high for several
periods and so shows greater persistence than other variables.
This is just a special case of a point that has been made in the incomplete
markets literature: agents who cannot fully insure are likely to use debt as a
bu¤er stock to smooth uctuations, increasing debt in bad times and reducing
it in good times. The government in our model is such an agent: it would
like to smooth taxes but since it does not have access to contingent debt it
cannot construct a portfolio whose payo¤ insulates its wealth from shocks to
the economy. Using debt as a bu¤er stock means that the e¤ect of todays
bad shock is spread over time, since the higher debt will cause future taxes to
be higher, in order to service higher future interest payments. The fact that
the higher debt is not repaid immediately leads to additional persistence of
17More precisely, that equation holds with with bgt 1 in the left side. This is shown in
proposition 1 of Aiyagari et al.
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debt compared to the behaviour of decits and output
Whilst the intuition behind this argument is strong it is not possible at
this level of generality to prove that the relative persistence of debt is high
under incomplete markets. In section 5 we will establish this claim in a
commonly used calibrated model via simulation. Now we prove analytically
this result in a special case.
An analytic example for persistence
Consider the above model. Assume productivity is constant so that yt =
1   lt: Assume fgtg is stochastic only at time t = 1, in particular, assume
P (g1 = g
H) = P (g1 = g
L) = :5 for two values gH > gL > 0; but g is constant
in all other periods: g0 = gt = g  gH+gL2 for all t  2: Utility is given by
u(c; l) = c+H(l) and further assume that initial debt is zero: bg 1 = 0:
Denote with superscripts H and L the values of all variables in all periods
under each realization of g1. The following result shows equilibrium sequences
under complete or incomplete markets.
Result
Under regularity assumptions (stated in the Technical Appendix)
 Under complete markets:
Decit is inuenced by the shock only in period t =1:
!g0 = !
g
2 = !
g
3 = ::: = 0 both realizations
!g;H1 > 0
Debt does not respond to a decit shock:18
vbgt = 0 for all t = 0; 1; ::: both realizations
 Under incomplete markets:
Decit is higher at t = 1 and lower for all t > 1 after a high shock:
!g0 < !
g;H
1 and !
g
0 > !
g;H
2 = !
g;H
3 = ::: (7)
18Since the decit is not serially correlated, this example does not display the comove-
ment of decit and debt under complete markets that was discussed in section 3.1.2.
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Debt increases permanently after a high shock
vb0 > vb
H
1 = vb
H
2 = ::: (8)
All inequalities reversed (and all equalities hold) in the event g1 = gL:
See proof in the Technical Appendix.
Therefore in this stylized example debt under incomplete markets shows
a permanent response to a temporary scal shock. The decit increases as
a result of a one time shock, then it decreases in all future periods but debt
is permanently higher forever, thus displaying a persistence greater than any
other variable.
3.2.2 Debt/decit co-movement
In 3.2.1 we gave an intuitive argument about why optimal policy under in-
complete markets is likely to use debt as a bu¤er stock. This implies that
and adverse shock (high g or low ) leads to high decit and higher debt.
Therefore, debt and decit co-move positively under incomplete markets, a
result we conrm by simulations in section 5.
It is instructive to reconsider the argument we gave for the negative co-
movement under complete markets and explore where it breaks down under
incomplete markets. A key element in the argument of section 3.1.2 was that
a high g caused all future decits to increase. Under incomplete markets a
bad shock increases todays decit but it decreases decits su¢ ciently far in
the future in order to service the additional interest.19 These lower future
primary decits are the reason why the discounted sum in (3) goes down
under incomplete markets.
4 What generalizes and what does not?
In the special model of section 3 we could analytically establish many of our
results. In this section we discuss how some of these results might generalize
to a broader class of models.
19To be precise, if g is highly serially correlated, it is only in the long run that future
decits are lower. The serial correlation of g may induce a high decit in the near future.
See impulse responses in section 5 for incomplete markets serially correlated shocks.
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The bu¤er stock behavior of debt, described intuitively in section 3.2.1, is
a very general feature of incomplete market models. The tax-smoothing e¤ect
of Barro (1979) and Aiyagari et al. (2002) imparts a unit root component to
taxes, this has been shown to extend to models with capital by Farhi (2005)
and Scott (2007), and it implies that debt is optimally used as a bu¤er stock.
In general, this will imply high persistence of debt and positive co-movement
of debt and decit. Simulations of section 5 conrm that this is the case for
a model with capital accumulation.
As for the generalization of the complete markets results, we show a
proposition for a general setup that is useful in arguing that debt is equally
persistent as output under complete markets in a large class of models. Of
independent interest is that this proposition was already used to derive (4)
in section 3, it is also useful in solving for debt under complete markets for
the capital accumulation model of section 5, and it has been used in Faraglia,
Marcet and Scott (2007b) to solve for the portfolio of maturities in a diversity
of complete market models.
Let us generalize the setup. Consider an economy consisting of exogenous
shocks (st) and endogenous variables (xt). The process fstg is Markov and,
for simplicity, assume that the distribution of the exogenous shocks condi-
tional on the past has a density. Without loss of generality let us partition
st into two subvectors st = (s1t ; s
2
t ) with s
2
t including those shocks known one
period ahead and s1t containing the rest
20. There are I agents and each agent
at time t chooses consumption and obtains net income from several sources,
!it denotes the value of agent i
0s decit (i.e. expenditure minus income) in
period t in units of the numéraire consumption good.
Under complete markets there exists a spot market for claims contingent
on all possible values of s1t+1: A bond contingent on a value s
1 2 S1 will
pay one unit of the consumption numéraire if s1t+1 = s
1 occurs, and zero
otherwise. Here S1  [1t=1 fsupport of s1tg : bit(s1) denotes the quantity of
bonds purchased by agent i at time t contingent on the occurrence of s1.
Hence, agent i has to choose a function bit : S
1 ! R in each period, this
function may depend on the period and the realization. The payo¤ of this
portfolio next period is bit(s
1
t+1) and the budget constraint of each agent
20More precisely, s2t contains the elements of st that are measurable with respect to st 1
and s1t those that are not.
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i = 1; :::; I satises
bit 1(s
1
t ) = !
i
t +
Z
S1
bit(s
1) pbt(s
1) ds1 (9)
for all agents, periods and realizations. Here pbt(s
1) is the price at time t of a
bond contingent on s1t+1 = s
1. All agents are prevented from defaulting and
from running Ponzi schemes. The market value of the bond portfolio held
by agent i is
vbit 
Z
S1
bit(s
1) pbt(s
1) ds1 . (10)
Obviously, the market value of debt held by agent i is  vbit.
Assume that in equilibrium decits and interest rates can be formulated
recursively in the sense that they are given by a time-invariant function of
some state variables zt. Formally
zt = h(zt 1; st) (11)
!it = f
i(zt 1; st) (12)
pbt(s
1) = p(s1; zt 1; st) (s1; st) (13)
for all i,t; s1;where  is the density of s1t+1 given st.
A large variety of models satisfy these assumptions, including models with
multiple agents, public goods, distorting taxation, time-non-separable utility
function, externalities, monopolistic power, market frictions, non-rational
expectations or credit constraints. Most models in the literature guarantee
that a version of (13) holds with p being the intertemporal marginal rate of
substitution of consumption for some agent.
Proposition 1 Under the above assumptions and given functions h; f; p
A) the equilibrium portfolio of bonds for agent i that satises the budget
constraint of agent i satises
bit() = Di(; s2t+1; zt) a.s. (14)
for all t; for the time invariant function Di
Di(st; zt 1)  !it + Et
1X
j=1
!it+j
j 1Y
=0
p(s1t++1; zt+ 1; st+ ) (15)
17
B) For each agent i, the value of the equilibrium portfolio of contingent
bonds vbit is given by a (time-invariant) function V
i such that
vbit = V
i(zt; st)  Et

Di(zt; s
1
t+1; s
2
t+1) p(s
1
t+1; zt; st)

a:s:
for all t.
Proof (See Technical Appendix)
This proposition is a very general result that simply relates bit and vb
i
t to
current values of stochastic shocks and the state variables under complete
markets. The rst part of this proposition states that the portfolio of bonds
issued at time t is independent of the realization of s1t - in other words, the
structure of bonds issued in each period does not respond to current period
unexpected shocks. It does however depend on shocks predictable one period
ahead and on the state variables zt. The second part of the proposition says
the market value of government debt (-vbt) responds to both current period
unexpected shocks and the state variables. The dependence of the market
value on current unexpected shocks arises from their impact on bond prices.
It has been shown that, under complete markets, equilibrium variables
such as decit and interest rates often do not depend on past debt.21 This is
because for many of these models all budget constraints can be substituted by
one implementability constraint such as the one in footnote 10. Combining
this knowledge with the above proposition allows us to conclude that in
many complete markets models debt is likely to be independent of past debt;
instead, debt is likely to be a function of real variables and, therefore, debt
will have no more persistence than real variables. For example, in the model
of Section 3 , since we know from equation (2) that there are no state variables
the above proposition implies (4), which allowed us to conclude that debt and
decit had the same persistence in section 3.1.1.
It is important to emphasize that proposition 1 B) per se does not allow
to discriminate between complete and incomplete markets. Since equation
(3) also holds in some incomplete markets models, strictly speaking, part B)
above would also hold in those cases as well. But in an incomplete markets
model the state vector zt will typically include past debt and/or a lagrange
multiplier, so that part B) under incomplete markets only conrms that
current debt is a function of past debt and it opens the door for debt to be
more persistent than real variables.
21See Chari and Kehoe (1999) for a review.
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Using an argument analogous to the one we used in 3.1.1., the proposition
implies that any extension of the model in section 3.1 (with any number of
agents, any number of shocks, any public good or externality, any preferences
of the government, ...) where optimal decit and interest rates are a function
only of exogenous state variables (that is, zt is empty) and where all the
elements of st share the same serial correlation, debt and decit will have the
same persistence and the model will violate Fact 1.
In general, though, the complete markets solution will include some real
variables in zt (say, past capital or past consumption). In these cases the
proposition shows that debt will not have more persistence than the most
persistent real variable. This suggests that debt and decit are likely to have
similar persistence but, unfortunately, it falls short of proving this point. To
see this let us extend the model to allow for capital accumulation so that the
resource constraint is given by22
ct + kt   (1  )kt 1 + gt = tkt 1(1  lt)1  = yt
where  is the depreciation rate of capital. For simplicity, we assume only
labor income is taxed at a rate  t:23
For the case of complete markets this model ts in the general frame-
work by having xt = ( t; lt; kt; ct); exogenous shocks st = s1t = (gt; t) and
endogenous state variable zt = kt: The solution is a time-invariant function
of (gt; t; kt 1) for t > 0. Therefore, part A) of our proposition says
bgt (g; ) = D
g(g; ; kt)
so that the portfolio of debt depends only on todays value of the capital
stock. According to Part B) the market value of bonds is given by
vbgt = V
g
CM(gt; t; kt) (16)
22This model under incomplete markets has also been analyzed by Farhi (2005) and
Scott (2007).
23Relative to papers studying optimal capital taxes we simplify by setting capital taxes
to zero for all time periods and all states of nature.Allowing for stochastic capital taxes
would potentially enable the complete market outcome to be achieved even in the absence
of state contingent debt, so the incomplete markets model we analyze later would not
be di¤erent from the complete markets one. Farhi (2006) introduces capital taxation and
assumes that governments have to commit one period ahead to the tax rate. This prevents
the complete market outcome from being achieved and allows for incomplete markets and
capital taxes.
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for a time invariant function VgCM . Again, past shocks, and the inuence they
possibly had on government debt, bear no inuence on todays equilibrium
value of government debt, over and above the e¤ect that past shocks have
on current capital, and so once more vbgt does not depend on past debt.
This proves that debt cannot be more persistent than capital, but it falls
short of proving that debt is equally persistent as decit. Debt could be more
persistent than decit if k (a very persistent variable) inuences debt more
strongly than output. This would seem a-priori unlikely, but it can only be
resolved in this specic model by simulation, as we do in the next section.
5 Simulations
In this section we resort to simulations to further justify the validity of these
tests. The simulations will show the quantitative e¤ects we have discussed,
and they will resolve a number of issues that could not be dealt with ana-
lytically in a model with capital. We do not set out to match US data as
closely as possible, rather our interest is in establishing di¤erences between
complete and incomplete market outcomes. As such we choose canonical
parameter values and functional forms rather than seek to estimate key pa-
rameters in order to mimic US data. However, it should be stressed that our
main qualitative results are robust to alternative parameterization.
5.1 Model 1 - No capital accumulation
In the model of section 3 we assume the utility function
u(ct; lt) =
c
1 1
t
1  1
+B
l
1 2
t
1  2
and set  =0.98 and 1=1, 2=2. We set B so that the share of leisure in
the time endowment equals 30% on average.
In keeping with the literature, we assume g follows a truncated AR(1),
and t a log AR(1) process
gt =
8<:
g
g
(1  g)g + g gt 1 + "gt
if (1  g)g + g gt 1 + "gt > g
if (1  g)g + g gt 1 + "gt < g
otherwise
log t = 
 log t 1 + "t
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for "gt ; "

t i.i.d., mean zero and mutually independent. We assume "

t 
N(0; 0:0072); "gt  N(0; 1:442); g = 17:5; with g =35% and g = 15% of
average GDP. These values are chosen so that in the non-stochastic steady
state of Model 1, government expenditure amounts to 25 percent of GDP and
uctuates within the range 15 and 35% of output. We consider two di¤erent
assumptions regarding the persistence of the shocks: a) both sequences are
i.i.d. (g =  = 0) and, b) strongly positively serially correlated shocks g =
 = 0:95.24 Assuming such high levels of persistence means in this respect
our model matches US data closely.
We use both impulse-response functions (IRF) and the k-variance ratio
to measure persistence. In using IRFs we start by studying the response
of each variable to the fundamental shocks in the model economy (gt; t):
We call this the true IRF. We obtain the i th coe¢ cient of the true IRF
by computing numerically how each variable would change i periods ahead
if, starting from the steady state mean, the innovation to each shock had a
realization equal to ("j ; 0; 0; :::), j = g; . When the true IRF coe¢ cients
at low frequencies are large relative to the coe¢ cients at high frequencies we
will say that the variable has high persistence.
The dashed lines of Figures 3 to 4 show the true IRFs and Figure 6 shows
the k-variance ratio for various models under both complete and incomplete
markets. Figure 3 shows Model 1 under i.i.d. shocks25. Not surprisingly,
given our discussion in section 3.1.1, all variables including debt are i.i.d., all
have zero persistence. The rst panel in the rst column of Figure 6 shows
the k-variance ratio for the same variables and shows an identical degree
of persistence across them all. By contrast, in the incomplete market case
(shown by the dotted lines) the response of debt to both shocks is highly per-
sistent, conrming that debt is used as a bu¤er stock to smooth uctuations.
This is conrmed by the k-variance ratio in Figure 6 (top right panel) while
most of the response of the other variables is on impact, consistent with Fact
1. The responses of the decit and debt to each shock in the rst few periods
have the same sign, agreeing with Fact 2.26
Figure 4 shows the true IRFs from the same model but now assuming
24All models are solved using the Parameterised Expectations Algorithm described in
den Haan and Marcet (1990).
25The vertical axis in Figures 3 to 5 are in units of the variable under consideration.
26Recall that for our argument in section 3.1.2 that debt and decit comoved in opposite
ways we needed serially correlated shocsk. This is why this feature is not present in the
iid case.
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persistent shocks g =  = 0:95. As expected from our discussion in section
3.1.2, the persistence in the shocks is passed through to all the endogenous
variables under complete markets. In all cases the response declines roughly
geometrically, at a rate of decay approximately equal to :95. The middle
panel of the left column in Figure 6 shows that all variables have approxi-
mately equal persistence.27 Figure 4 also conrms our results in section 3.1.2
and extends them to the productivity shock: under complete markets debt
goes down (up) in response to a higher gt (t): The sign of the response of the
primary decit is now the opposite from the sign shown by the debt response.
Therefore, debt and decit comove in opposite directions.
The incomplete market case in Figure 4 for persistent shocks reveals a
more complex picture. The response of debt to both shocks is increasing (in
absolute value) for many periods and the e¤ect is shifted to low frequencies.
This combination causes the k-variance ratios to reveal substantially more
persistence of debt in the case of incomplete markets, and much more per-
sistence than the other variables - compare the middle panels of Figure 6.
Compared to our US ndings in Figure 2 the model seems to overshoot, since
now the k-variance ratios for debt reach a value larger than 5 after 10 years
compared with a k-variance ratio of 2 in the data.
Figure 4 also shows that under incomplete markets the response of debt
and decit has the same sign, at least in the short and medium run. This
conrms our discussion in section 3.2 that the government uses debt as a
bu¤er stock, increasing debt as a response to a bad shock, hence the co-
movement of debt and decit is as in the data. Notice also that under
incomplete markets the response of decits changes sign in the long run.
This is because primary decits eventually have to decrease in response to
a bad shock, in order to service the additional interest payments caused by
higher debt. This feature of the decit response played an important role in
our discussion in section 3.2.2 and it agrees with the point estimates of the
empirical impulse response of Figure 1.
5.2 Model 2 - Capital accumulation
We now study simulations of the capital accumulation model introduced at
the end of section 4. Notice that this model has a near unit root in debt even
under complete markets, because capital imparts a near unit root behavior,
27The persistence is not exactly equal in all variables due to non-linearities of the model.
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showing that unit root tests are not the correct way to discriminate between
complete and incomplete markets.
To perform the simulations we extend our calibration and set the depre-
ciation rate  = 0:05,  = 0:4 and to focus on the most persistent case we
consider only the case g =  = 0:95.
The true IRFs are shown in Figure 5. For the case of complete markets
most responses decay to zero from an initially high level, the main exception
being the response of output to government spending, which shows a rela-
tively large long run negative e¤ect after an initially positive response. Also
notice that the responses to the productivity shock are longer-lived. None
of the responses are humped-shaped, and certainly not the response of debt,
suggesting that persistence is about the same in all variables. To give a nal
answer about persistence, the last panel of the left column in Figure 6 shows
that according to the k-variance ratio output and decit are more persistent
than debt under complete markets; so, the relative persistence of debt is
now the opposite as in the data. The co-movement of decit and debt, it
is also unlike the data, since debt and decit respond in opposite ways to
each shock. In other words, the result of introducing capital is to take the
complete markets model even further away from the data.
Figure 5 also shows that the case of incomplete markets is once more
diametrically opposed to the complete market outcome and much more con-
sistent with the data.28 It is interesting to note that both output and debt
have a roughly equally persistent response to an innovation in g, while the
response of debt to an innovation in  is much more persistent than that of
output. Debt seems to display the greatest persistence amongst the endoge-
nous variables since it shows clearly humped shaped IRF. The lower panels
of Figure 5 again show that under incomplete markets the decits and debt
move in the same direction in response to each shock, consistent with US
data. Once more in the long run the IRF of decit has to reverse sign in
order to service the additional interest payments. Figure 6 conrms that un-
der incomplete markets debt displays greater persistence than other variables
although as with model 1 there is too much persistence.
The results above on true IRFs have been based around identifying the
true theoretical innovations to productivity and government expenditure.
28We have checked that this sort of behavior of debt under incomplete markets is present
under most parameter values and under various models that we have explored. For exam-
ple, the same sort of behavior occurs in the model of Gorostiaga (2003), which introduces
frictions in the labor market and endogenous government spending.
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These shocks are hard to identify in the data, this is why we used a VAR
with a Cholesky decomposition to generate Figure 1. To ensure consistency
between theoretical and empirical results we also compute the IRF in the
model by estimating an identical VAR as in Section 2 but using simulated
data. We call this the estimated IRF. The true IRF helps us understand
the properties of our model, while the estimated IRF enable us to compare
directly the model with the data and the validity of our tests.
The estimated IRF is shown in Figures 7 and 8. Conrm the validity of
our tests in this broader setting - complete markets (Figure 7) shows debt is
less persistence and falls in response to adverse "decit" shocks (identied
in the above method) whereas incomplete markets (Figure 8) generates IRFs
that display higher persistence of debt and the appropriate co-movement of
debt and decit.
To summarize the results in this section: the complete market analysis is
inconsistent with our ndings for US data, particularly Facts 1 and 2, while
introducing incomplete markets model provides a very large improvement.
These results suggest that governments use variations in the level of debt as
a bu¤er stock for scal shocks rather than using the insurance role that bond
interest payments play in the case of complete markets.
6 Implications and Extensions.
The aim of our analysis has to been to assess the relative importance of
complete or incomplete bond markets in a¤ecting the behaviour of debt and
governments scal policy. Our results here for the US, and those of Faraglia,
Marcet and Scott (2007a) for the OECD, all suggest that bond markets are
incomplete and that this incompleteness directly impacts on scal behav-
iour. However we have not sought in this paper to calibrate the degree of
market incompleteness that exists. Indeed by focusing on the case of one
period risk free bonds we nd that our model now generates too much per-
sistence in government debt. Presumably allowing for governments to gain
some insurance against particular contingencies would give an intermediate
position between the two cases we consider and better match quantitatively
the persistence of debt. An important research agenda is therefore gauging
the degree of incompleteness and in particular which shocks governments are
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unable to obtain insurance for.29
The interpretation of our results we have stressed is both that bond mar-
kets are incomplete and that this matters for scal policy. However the
conclusion that bond markets are incomplete rests on rejecting a joint hy-
pothesis of a Ramsey government and complete markets. It could equally be
argued that the real cause of this rejection is due to the Ramsey assumption
rather than market incompleteness. Perhaps governments behave subopti-
mally due, for example, to political economy issues. Potentially this would
be an interesting issue to analyse. It should be emphasized, however, that we
have provided a model (based on market incompleteness) that improves the
t with the data very substantially, it is still to be shown if a model of po-
litical economy (and complete markets) can achieve such good results. One
di¢ culty in pursuing this line of reasoning is the absence, to date, of a canon-
ical political economy model and so we leave for future work an examination
of this issue.
A number of papers in the optimal taxation literature accept that bond
markets may be imperfect but that this need not constrain governments who
can replicate optimal scal policy under complete markets by alternative
policy instruments. To cite some examples within the literature on optimal
policy, Angeletos (2002) and Buera and Nicolini (2004) show how to use debt
management, Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1994) state contingent capital
taxation, related to this, Farhi (2005) investigates the possibility of using
government ownership of capital to achieve the same outcome and Chari,
Christiano and Kehoe (1991)monetary policy in order to e¤ectively complete
markets.
Because our main results are on the behaviour of debt itself rather than
the type of assets the government issues or the portfolio composition of debt,
our results do show that the models in the above papers are not good descrip-
tions of the data. Governments have not, for whatever reason, used these
other policy instruments to achieve the complete market outcome. In other
words, if we accept that bond markets are incomplete then as a matter of
practice this has constrained scal policy as governments have not utilised
these other channels to achieve the complete market outcome.
Another interpretation of the papers cited above would be that market
29In this vein, Sleet (2004) investigates the case where governments have access to private
information so that rates of return o¤er limited state contingency but markets are still
incomplete. He does nd that debt is still persistent but less so than in the models of the
present paper.
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incompleteness cannot be an important element in explaining the data, since
in fact governments have many ways of achieving the complete markets out-
come. This could be taken as indirect evidence that in fact governments have
behaved suboptimally and the role of the papers mentioned above would be
to tell governments how debt management, capital taxes or ination policy
should be run.
We dispute this interpretation because these alternative policies all have
substantial costs attached to them which make the optimal policies di¢ cult
to implement. For instance, Faraglia, Marcet and Scott (2007b) show that, in
many environments, completing the markets with debt management a la An-
geletos (2002) would require portfolio positions of several multiples of GDP
at each maturity and that the optimal portfolio structure is both potentially
volatile over time and extremely sensitive, both quantitatively and qualiti-
tatively, to small changes in the model.30 Chari et al. (1994) suggest using
uctuations in ex post capital taxes to achieve the complete market outcome
but their own simulation results suggest this requires a standard deviation of
around 40% in capital tax rates(see their Table 2). Even accepting the argu-
ment in Judd (1992) that conventional measures of capital taxes understate
volatility by ignoring corporate allowances it is hard to think that capital
taxes in the real economy could adjust ex-post to this degree. Chari et al.
(1991) show that the ination policy required to complete markets is also
extremely volatile, ination should have a standard deviation of between 20
or 30%.
It is possible that the implied volatility in bond positions, capital taxes
or ination are su¢ ciently costly or distortionary (for a variety of reasons -
political economy factors, transaction costs in bond markets or real/nominal
rigidities, di¢ culties in reaching the rational expectations outcome if agents
use learning schemes) that governments do not wish to use them to achieve
the complete market outcome. For example, Farhi (2005) outlines reasons
why an extremely volatile tax rate on capital might be very distortionary,
and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) show that if mild costs of adjusting
prices are introduced the benets of completing the markets by adjusting
ination are lost. This would suggest that the Ramsey model with complete
markets should not be used literally as a template to make recommendations
about debt management, ination or capital taxes. These instruments may
play a role in partly insuring governments risks, and considering them may
30This point was already made in a simple model by Buera and Nicolini (2004).
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drive the behavior of debt closer to the data than our one period risk free
assumption. However in our opinion it is important that enough constraints
are kept in the model so that the Ramsey complete markets outcome cannot
be attained.
7 Conclusion
The aim of this paper has been to revisit the topic of Barros (1979) paper -
the determination of public debt - and to use the implications of optimal tax-
ation to provide a test for discriminating between complete and incomplete
markets. This refocusing on debt enables us to arrive at a simple but sharp
test for the importance of incomplete markets which is robust to a range of
assumptions and has broad applicability.
When markets are complete government debt shows the same or less per-
sistence than other variables in the economy; furthermore, debt and decit
comove in opposite directions. US data is inconsistent with both of these im-
plications of complete markets: in fact, debt is more persistent than decit
and output, and debt moves in the same direction as decit. We show that
both puzzles are solved by the introduction of incomplete markets. This
observation allows us to, rst, reject complete markets, second, accept in-
complete markets.
Our simulation results suggest that the way we model market incomplete-
ness may be too extreme. A fruitful area of research could be to identify the
precise nature of the causes of incompleteness and to allow governments to
use some instruments to insure against shocks.
Our analysis is of a joint hypothesis of complete or incomplete markets
in conjunction with a Ramsey planner. Therefore our ndings against com-
plete markets could alternatively be interpreted as a rejection of the Ramsey
assumption and as evidence that the US government has been behaving sub-
optimally. But in order to prove this point one should provide a model that
explains why governments chose the policies they did. Until a tractable and
widely accepted alternative to the Ramsey planner exists (which it does not)
it is not possible to know how robust our two tests are to alternative assump-
tions on government behaviour. It will be interesting to see if a model of, say,
political economy, is able to match Facts 1 and 2 under complete markets as
well as our o¤-the-shelf Ramsey models with incomplete markets.
While our analysis has focused exclusively on government scal policy we
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stress that our general results should extend to the behavior of consumer,
rms or open economy debt. It seems that the behavior of debt o¤ers the
best chance to distinguish complete versus incomplete markets.
References
[1] Aiyagari, R.,Marcet, A., Sargent, T.J. and Seppälä, J. (2002) Optimal
Taxation without State-Contingent Debt, Journal of Political Econ-
omy, 110, 1220-1254
[2] Angeletos, G-M (2002) Fiscal policy with non-contingent debt and op-
timal maturity structure, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 27, 1105-
1131
[3] Barro, R.J. (1979) On the determination of the public debt, Journal
of Political Economy, 87, 940-71.
[4] Blanchard, O. and Perotti, R. (1999) An empirical characterization of
the dynamic e¤ects of changes in government spending and taxation on
output, NBER Working Paper 7269.
[5] Buera F. and J.P. Nicolini (2004) Optimal Maturity of Government
Debt with Incomplete Markets, Journal of Monetary Economics, 51,
531-554 .
[6] Butkiewicz, J.L (1983) The Market Value of Outstanding Government
Debt : A Comment, Journal of Monetary Economics, 11, 373-379
[7] Burnside, C., Eichenbaum, M. and Fisher, J. (2004) Assessing the ef-
fects of scal shocks, Journal of Economic Theory 115, 89-117.
[8] Chari, V.V, Christiano, L.J and Kehoe, P.J (1991) Optimal Fiscal and
Monetary Policy : Some Recent Results, Journal of Money, Credit and
Banking 23: 519-40
[9] Chari, V.V., Christiano, L.J. and Kehoe, P.J. (1994) Optimal Fiscal
Policy in a Business Cycle Model, Journal of Political Economy, 102,
617-652.
28
[10] Chari, V.V. and P. Kehoe (1999): Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Pol-
icyin Handbook of Macroeconomics, John Taylor and Mike Woodford,
eds. (North Holland: Amsterdam).
[11] Cochrane, J. (1988) How big is the random walk in GNP? , Journal
of Political Economy 96, 893-920.
[12] Cox, W.Michael and Hirschorn, E (1983) The market value of US gov-
ernment debt, Monthly, 1942-80 Journal of Monetary Economics 11,
261-272
[13] den Haan, W. and Marcet, A. (1990) Solving the stochastic growth
model by parameterizing expectations, Journal of Business and Eco-
nomic Statistics, 8, 31-34.
[14] Faraglia, E., A. Marcet and A. Scott (2007a); "Fiscal Insurance and
Debt Management in OECD Economies", working paper, London Busi-
ness School.
[15] Faraglia, E., A. Marcet and A. Scott (2007b); "In Search of a Theory of
Debt Management", working paper, London Business School.
[16] Farhi, E (2005) Capital Taxation and Ownership when Markets are
Incomplete, MIT mimeo
[17] Gorostiaga, A. (2003) Should Fiscal Policy be Di¤erent in a Non-
Competitive Framework?, Journal of Monetary Economics, 50 (6) pp
1113-1331
[18] Heaton, J and Lucas, D (1996) Evaluating the e¤ects of incomplete
markets on risk sharing and asset pricing , Journal of Political Economy
104, 443-487.
[19] Judd, K (1992) Optimal Taxation in Dynamic Stochastic Economies :
Theory and Evidence, Stanford University mimeo
[20] Krusell, P. and A. Smith (1998) Income and Wealth Heterogeneity in
the Macroeconomy, Journal of Political Economy, 106:5, 867-896
[21] Lucas, R.E. and Stokey, N.L. (1983) Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Pol-
icy in an Economy without Capital, Journal of Monetary Economics,
12, 55-93.
29
[22] Marcet, A. and K.J. Singleton (1999) Equilibrium Asset Pricing and
Saving under Incomplete Markets and Portfolio Constraints, Macro-
economic Dynamics, 3, pp 243-277
[23] Schmidt-Grohe, S. and M. Uribe (2004) Optimal Fiscal and Monetary
Policy under Sticky Prices, Journal of Economic Theory.
[24] Scott, A. (2007) Optimal Taxation and OECD Labor Taxes, Journal
of Monetary Economics, Volume 54, Issue 3, 925-944
[25] Seater, J (1981) The market value of outstanding govrnment debt 1919-
75, Journal of Monetary Economics 8, 85-101
[26] Sleet, C (2004) Optimal Taxation with Private Government Informa-
tion, Review of Economic Studies, 1217-1239
[27] Tellmer, C. (1993) Asset Pricing puzzles and incomplete markets ,
Journal of Finance 48, 1803-32.
[28] Werning, I (2005) Tax smoothing with incomplete markets MIT
mimeo
[29] Zhu, X (1992) Optimal Fiscal Policy in a Stochastic Growth Model
Journal of Economic Theory 58 250-89
30
Appendix 1: Data
We use annual US data. Data for the total decit, government expendi-
ture and tax revenue from 1900 to 1999 was from the Economic Report of
the President and downloaded from www.ibert.org/decit.html. The BEA
website provided current and constant price GDP (available from 1900 and
1929 respectively). Interest payments were available on a scal year basis
from 1940 onwards at http://w3.access.gpo.gov/usbudget. These were con-
verted into a calendar year basis by multiplying adjoining years by 0.25 and
0.75 e.g. 1941 interest payments were calculated as 0.75 of 1940/41 scal
year payments plus 0.25 of 1941/42 scal payments. The resulting series was
then removed from the total decit series to arrive at a primary decit series
from 1940 onwards.
The main complication was in nding a consistent series for the market
value of US government debt. Seater (1981) provides an annual series for 1919
to 1975. Cox and Hirschorn (1983) provide a monthly series between 1945
and 1980. As the latter shows these two studies arrive at highly consistent
results. Butkiewicz (1983) outlines a more time e¢ cient way of calculating
the series and again reveals discrepancies to be small between the alternative
approaches. We therefore construct a market value series from 1919 to 1999
using a) Seater for 1919 to 1975 b) Cox and Hirschorn 1976-1980 and c)
extend the series to 1999 using Butkiewicz formula and OECD data, Central
Government Debt Statistics. The full data is available upon request.
Although we have been careful to do our study with the market value of
debt, which is the appropriate counterpart of debt in the model, the results
in section 2 stay almost the same for a measure of the total outstanding debt
from OECD.
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Appendix 2
Debt/Decit Co-movement under complete markets
In section 3.1.2 we argued that the co-movement of debt and decit is
negative by arguing that @ vb
g
t
@ "gt
> 0. Here we give a detailed proof: Taking
derivatives on both sides of (3) we see @ vb
g
t
@ "gt
is equal to:
 ucc;t
uc;t
G0c(gt) vb
g
t
+Et
1X
j=1
()j
ucc;t+j
uc;t
G0c(gt+j)!
g
t+j (17)
+Et
1X
j=1
j
uc;t+j
uc;t
G0!(gt+j)j
where we used @ gt+j
@ "gt
= j. Assumptions Ai) and Aii) imply that the third
line is unambiguously positive, and it grows with .
In the case that uc;t = 1 we have ucc;t = 0; the rst and second lines in
(17) are zero, this gives the formula we showed in section 3.1.2.
In the general case, as long as the government is in debt vbgt < 0 and the
rst line is unambiguously positive. The second line is a discounted sum of
future decits, similar to vbgt ; but where the discounting term
uc;t+j
uc;t
in (3)
is replaced by ucc;t+j
uc;t
@ Gc(gt+j)
@ gt+j
j: Since this "new" discount factor is positive,
the second line of (17) is likely to be positive if the government is in debt.
Therefore, even though it is possible to construct examples where the rst
and second line in (17) would be negative, this would require the government
to hold savings. If, in addition, the utility function had su¢ cient curvature
for ucc;t to be large, and  would be su¢ ciently low, the possibly negative rst
and second lines could compensate the unambiguously positive third line to
have @ vb
g
t
@ "gt
< 0. Only in this case would we then have a positive co-movement
of debt and decit31
To summarize, debt increases with a surprise increase to g if i) interest
rates respond strongly to a shock in g; ii) serial correlation of government
31One such case is if g is iid, the government has savings at t (ie, vbgt > 0) and u is
strictly concave in consumption. In this case  = 0 so that the second and third lines are
zero, and the rst line is negative. Notice that  = 0 is excluded by assumption Aii), since
it would contradict Fact 3.
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spending is low and iii)government holds positive savings. Since none of these
elements can be found in the data we claim that the co-movement of decit
and debt is negative under complete markets for a "reasonable" calibration
of the model.
Appendix 3: Technical Appendix
Assumptions and Proof of Result 1 in Subsection 3.2.1.
The rst order conditions of the consumer and of the Ramsey optimizer
under both complete and incomplete markets imply32
H 0(lt) = 1   t (18)
H 0(lt) + t [1 H 0(lt) +H 00(lt)(1  lt)] = 0 (19)
t = Et(t+1) (20)
where t is the Lagrange multiplier of the government budget constraint.
We need to dene the function () mapping feasible revenue values into
the corresponding multiplier  guaranteeing that (19) and (18) hold. For-
mally, for any feasible R,  is dened as
(R)   1 H
0(l) +H 00(l)(1  l)
H 0(l)
where l is the corresponding labor satisfying R  (1 H 0(l))(1  l).
We assume H is such that  is strictly monotone33 and that there is an
interior solution with probability one in all periods for both the consumer
and the government.
Finally we assume  > :5 .
Under these conditions the result stated in 3.2.1 holds according to the
following
Proof
32See, for example, Aiyagari et al (2002).
33Su¢ cient conditions on H for this result are found in footnote 14 in AMSS.
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For the government spending process above we have
Et (gt+j) = g for all t  0 and for all j > 0: (21)
Let us consider rst the complete markets part. Following Lucas and
Stokey (1983), (19) is satised with t =  for all t. This, together with (18)
implies that leisure and taxes are constant, say lcm = lt;  cm =  t.
From the budget constraint of the government at period zero we have
0 = E0
1X
t=0
t !gt =
1X
t=0
t [E0 (gt)   cm(1  lcm)] = g   
cm(1  lcm)
1  
where the rst equality uses u0c = 1; the second equality uses constancy of
taxes and leisure, and the third equality uses (21). Therefore,
!gt = gt    cm(1  lcm) = g    cm(1  lcm) = 0 t = 0; 2; 3; :::
!g;Ht = g
H    cm(1  lcm) = gH   g =  > 0 t = 1
This proves the statements about the decit under complete markets.
The value of debt satises
vbgt =
1X
j=1
j ( cm(1  lcm)  Et (gt+j)) = 0
for all t; where the rst equality follows from (3) and constancy of taxes and
hours, and the second equality follows from (21) and our analysis of decit.
This shows our statements about debt under complete markets.
We now prove the statements about incomplete markets. Since there is
no uncertainty after period 1, (20) implies that Et(t+1) = t+1 for all t  1,
so that t = 1 for all t  1: Then (19) implies l1 = lt and (18)  1 =  t for
all t  1 and all realizations, and since g is also constant after period 2 we
have !g2 = !
g
t for all t > 2 and all realizations, proving the equalities of (7).
From proposition 1 in AMSS and uc;t = 1 we have
bgt 1 = Et
1X
j=0
j !gt+j for all t: (22)
This and the fact that decit is constant for all t  2 imply
vbgt = b
g
t = 
g    1(1  l1)
1   for all t  1
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which proves the equalities in (8).
The remainder of this proof shows that !g;H1 > !
g
0: Since (22) and the
equalities in (7) imply that bg1 =
1(1 l1) g
1  , and by assumption b
g
 1 = 0, the
budget constraint of the government at periods 0 and 1 imply
 1 (g    0(1  l0)) =  bg0 =  1(1  l1)  g1 + 
 1(1  l1)  g
1   (23)
Let us denote revenue by Rt   t(1   lt). Since the last equation holds for
both realizations of g1 and b
g
0 is not random, we have
 bg0 = RH1   gH + 
RH1   g
1   = R
L
1   gL + 
RL1   g
1   (24)
and, using gH   gL = 2 this implies
RH1  RL1 = (1  )2 > 0 (25)
Applying (20) at t = 0 gives
(R0) = 0 = E0(1) =
(RH1 ) + (R
L
1 )
2
(26)
and, since RH1 > R
L
1 and  is strictly monotone we have
RH1 > R0 > R
L
1 . (27)
The equality in (25) and the assumption  > 0:5 imply
RH1  RL1 < 
and together with (27) we have RH1   R0 < . Since gH1   g0 = , we have
that !g;H1 > !
g
0:
No-Ponzi-Scheme condition, section 4.
The no-Ponzi-scheme condition we alluded to in section 4 requires prices
and bonds to satisfy
lim
T!1
Et
 
bt+T (s
1
t+T+1)
TY
j=1
p(s1t+j+1; zt+j 1; st+j)
!
= 0 a.s. (28)
for all t. This is satised in most models, where b is bounded and p is the
intertemporal elasticity of consumption:
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Proof of Proposition 1
To show part A) we rst show that a sequence of bond holdings that
satises the budget constraints satises
bit 1(s
1
t ) = !
i
t +
Z
S1
bit(s
1) p(s1; zt 1; st) (s1; st) ds1
= !it + Et
 
bit(s
1
t+1) p(s
1
t+1; zt 1; st)

(29)
= !it + Et
1X
j=1
!it+j
j 1Y
=0
p(s1t++1; zt+ 1; st+ ) a.s.
The rst equality uses (9) and (13), the second equality uses the denition
of conditional expectation, and the third equality is obtained by recursive
forward substitution of the random variable bit(s
1
t+1) and (28). Furthermore,
the Markov assumption about st together with (11), (12), (13) imply that the
conditional expectations of the discounted sum in (29) is a function only of
(st; zt 1): This means that a time-invariant function Di satisfying (15) exists
and together with (29) it implies (14).
To establish part B) note that plugging (14) in the budget constraint and
using (13) implyZ
S1
bit(s
1) pbt(s
1) ds1 =
Z
S1
Di(s1; s2t+1; zt) p(s
1; zt; st) (s
1; st) ds
1
so that the right side of this function is a time invariant function of zt; st:
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Appendix 4
The Value of debt in the model
This appendix discusses what is the quantity in the model that should be
contrasted with the value of debt in the data.
Let us keep the notation in the text of the paper, where vbgt denotes the
value of assets owned by the government at the end of period t; so that vbgt
is given by (10) under complete markets and vbgt  pbtbgt under incomplete
markets. Let pybgt denote the payo¤ (ie. the redemption value) of the bond
portfolio purchased last period, that is, pybgt  bgt 1(st) for complete markets
and pybgt  bgt 1 for incomplete markets.
We take it for granted that the empirically relevant measure of debt is the
market value of debt (as opposed to the face value of debt). This has been
discussed extensively elsewhere (see, among many others, Seater(1981)). The
issue we address here is, should we compare the data on the market value of
debt with the model predictions about vbgt or pyb
g
t ?.
It is easy to see that in the context of either model 1 or model 2 considered
in the text, both for complete and incomplete markets, we have:
vbgt = Et
1X
j=1
j
uc;t+j
uc;t
!gt+j (30)
pybgt = !
g
t + vb
g
t (31)
That (30) holds for complete markets is established, for example, in the
proof of proposition 1 above. That it holds for incomplete markets is shown
in Aiyagari et al. in the case of model 1. Equation (31) follows from the
budget constraint.
The critical distinction between complete and incomplete markets arises
from the fact that under complete markets pybgt can change with todays
realization of the shock, while under incomplete markets the value of pybgt
is not a function of the state of the world at time t: This means that the
right hand side of the budget constraint (31) cannot be state contingent, so
that tax rates have to adjust to government expenditure shocks to ensure the
constraint holds.
Whether we take vbgt or pyb
g
t to represent the quantity of debt in the
model matters because in general these quantities behave di¤erently. As we
explained in the text, labor taxes are essentially constant under complete
37
markets whereas under incomplete markets they contain roughly a unit root.
Consider the case if i.i.d. gt and a realization where gt is unexpectedly high.
Since the current realization does not a¤ect gt+j, j > 1; under complete
markets !gt increases while vb
g
t remains roughly unchanged. As a consequence
pybgt increases. By contrast under incomplete markets pyb
g
t is predetermined
so that, with !gt higher due to the high expenditure shock, vb
g
t has to decrease
and it does so in part through smaller future decits !gt+j. The result is pyb
g
t
unchanged but vbgt decreases. Hence, in this case vb
g
t and pyb
g
t move in
opposite directions depending on whether we have complete or incomplete
markets.
Let us consider more closely what is the empirical measure of debt that
we use. As described in appendix 1 our empirical measure applies a certain
formula to valuate as accurately as possible the stock of debt that government
holds at the end of each year. Therefore, assuming that the government does
not repurchase the bonds it has issued (as is most often the case with actual
government debt) and assuming that all bonds have a maturity longer than
one year, it is clear that the empirical measure of debt
does not include bonds that matured in the course of the year ; (32)
and it includes all bonds that were issued during the year
Now we should determine if this quantity most resembles pybgt or vb
g
t : For
this purpose the one-period bonds used in the model are not very useful,
because they are so di¤erent from actual government bonds. We can give a
clearer answer if we rewrite the model in terms of multiperiod bonds that
are not repurchased. Formally, letting bg;Nt be a real riskless bond issued at
t that matures in N periods without repurchase, we have34
vbgt =
N 1X
i=1
pN it b
g;N
t i + b
g;N
t
pybgt =
N 1X
i=1
pN it b
g;N
t i + b
g;N
t N
Clearly, the only di¤erence among the two is the way that the terms bg;Nt N
and bg;Nt enter in each quantity. In words, bonds issued at t (i.e., b
g;N
t ) are
34This follows, for example, from section 7 of Faraglia, Marcet and Scott (2007) setting
the short bond to zero: bg;1t = 0.
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included in vbgt and they are not included in pyb
g
t , while the opposite is true
of bonds maturing at t (i.e., bg;Nt N):
Notice that the sentence (32) says that bg;Nt N is not included in the em-
pirical measure of debt at t, while bg;Nt is included. Therefore, the quantity
of debt in the model that should be compared with the data is vbgt and not
pybgt : This justies our choice of vb
g
t as the variable to describe the market
value of debt in the model, and this is the quantity that represents debt in
Figures 3 to 8.
One may question, however, if the timing of the debt reported by actual
governments and included in the data sets available can be so accurate as to
measure actual debt at the end of the year. After all governments can use
a number of accounting tricks to change the debt reported at a given date.
This would say that pybgt should be taken into account, at least in part, as
representing the debt in the model. This could be a problem if the behavior
of vbgt di¤ers considerably from that of pyb
g
t , such as in the i.i.d. case we
discussed in the rst page of this appendix.
Fortunately, for serially correlated shocks (the empirically relevant case)
the true IRF of vbgt and pyb
g
t is very similar. To see this, assume we added
two more graphs in Figure 4 showing the true IRF of pybgt : It follows from
(31) that the true IRF of pybgt can be obtained by adding the rst and third
rows of gure 4. Looking at the units in the vertical axes of Figure 4 it is
clear that the size of the response of debt is much larger than the size of the
response to decit. Therefore the response of pybgt is likely to be very similar
to the third row in Figure 4. The actual IRF is given in Figure A1, it is clear
that true IRF of vbgt and pyb
g
t is very close.
We conclude that interpreting vbgt as the quantity representing the market
value of debt is the better alternative, since it is closer to the empirical
denition of debt. In any case, its true IRF it is quite close to the alternative
pybgt so this choice does not make much di¤erence for the results of the paper:
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Figure 1 
Estimated Impulse Response Functions on US Data 1950-99. 
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Figure 2 
k-variance statistic for US data. 1950-99   
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                     True IRF, Model 1 (iid Shocks) 
  
 
         Figure 4  
            True IRF Model 1 (Persistent Shocks) 
  
 
 
          Figure 5 
True IRF, Model 2 (Capital accumulation, persistent Shocks) 
  
          Complete Markets   Incomplete Markets  
Figure 6  
k-variance ratios (persistence measures) for all models 
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Figure 7 
Estimated IRF, Model 2, Persistent Shocks, Complete Markets. 
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Figure 8 
Estimated IRF, Model 2, Persistent Shocks, Incomplete Markets  
FIGURE A.1
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